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Does One Size Fit All? A Comparative Study to Determine an Alternative to 
International Patent Harmonization 
 
by 
 
Rohan. K. George 
(Columbia Law School) 
Introduction 
 
The Agreement for Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was ratified by a 
majority of the countries of the world in 1994 as a precondition to membership in the World Trade 
Organization. Today, 153 of the countries of the world are parties to the TRIPS Agreement. The effect 
of the TRIPS Agreement was to create the first international substantive standards of patent 
harmonization, and to cause many countries to adopt intellectual property laws far stronger than they 
had in existence at the time. Today, the process of patent harmonization initiated with the TRIPS 
Agreement moves forward, through a combination of multilateral discussions for a Substantive Patent 
Law Treaty and bilateral treaties and negotiations incorporating stronger standards of intellectual 
property protection than those implemented under the TRIPS Agreement. 
Whether this process of international adoption of stronger patent standards is beneficial to all countries 
involved is a question that has dominated the international patent debate since the TRIPS Agreement. 
Many developing countries have protested having to adopt stronger patent protection measures, and 
public health and access to medicine concerns caused by the rising prices of patented pharmaceuticals 
dominate the discourse around the TRIPS Agreement. All of these factors beg the question: Does a 'one 
size fit all' policy of international patent harmonization make sense to all countries equally? 
From the experience of the United States, it appears that a strong patent system can be beneficial to the 
economic and industrial development of a country. However, the experiences of other countries has 
shown that stronger standards can even retard economic growth, instead of benefitting it. The purpose 
of this paper is to examine the economic and historic  justifications of the worldwide shift towards 
stronger patent laws. In doing so, it also seeks to determine whether there is a case to be made for the 
alternative, a shift towards discrete levels of patent protection, where countries choose patent laws 
according to their economic, social and industrial needs, and not according to an externally dictated 
process of standardization. 
The first part of my paper examines the history of patent harmonization, and current efforts to extend 
the process of harmonization further. The second part asks whether there is a stronger argument for 
each country to take its own discrete stand on its patent laws instead of staying on the harmonization 
bandwagon. In doing this, it examines examples from the histories of some major developing countries, 
as well as the history of patent law in the developing country experience. It also analyses the economic 
benefits of patent harmonization versus a discrete patent system. The third part of this paper compares 
the patent systems of India and the United States, two countries with distinct approaches to the use of 
intellectual property, and determines the extent to which the unique features of each benefit them. 
I. The History of International Patent Harmonization 
 Multilateral Efforts Towards Harmonization 
Given the dependence of any patent regime upon administrative systems, it is not surprising to note that 
the process of international patent harmonisation began with the Paris Convention and an international 
commitment to respect filing dates for patent applications – a predominantly procedural commitment. 
Of equal importance, however, was the commitment of each signatory country to provide equivalent 
treatment under national patent laws to citizens of all other signatory countries, a step which 
established the groundwork for an international market for patents 1.    
The first step towards substantive harmonisation of patent laws, however, was not to come until a 
century later, with the WIPO's failed attempt to create a  'Treaty Supplementing the Paris Convention as 
far as Patents are Concerned' (Old Patent Harmonization Treaty') 2. Discussions concerning the 
treaty, however, broke down in 1992 with key disagreements between developed and developing 
countries, as well as within the developed countries themselves. An important factor contributing to the
breakdown of negotiations was the United States' refusal to accept the 'first-to-file' requirement 
proposed under the treaty
 
n of 
technology5. 
                                                
3. The provisions of the draft treaty, however, were important in that they laid 
down a foundation for the creation of parameters for patent harmonization such as the creatio
conditions of patentability4 and the applicability of patent protection to all fields of 
 
1 PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, ARTS. 2 AND 4, MARCH 20, 1883, 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/ip/paris/pdf/trtdocs_wo020.pdf  
2 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE FOR THE CONCLUSION OF A TREATY SUPPLEMENTING THE PARIS CONVENTION AS FAR AS 
PATENTS ARE CONCERNED & WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC 
CONFERENCE FOR THE CONCLUSION OF A TREATY SUPPLEMENTING THE PARIS CONVENTION AS FAR AS PATENTS ARE 
CONCERNED 629 (1991) 
3 CORREA, CARLOS (2005), AN AGENDA FOR PATENT REFORM AND HARMONIZATION FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, PAPER 
PRESENTED AT THE BELLAGIO DIALOGUE ON “INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: REVISING  
THE  AGENDA  IN  A  NEW  CONTEXT”, ICTSD, 24  –  28  SEPTEMBER  2005,  BELLAGIO,  ITALY, AVAILABLE AT 
www.ictsd.org, P. 2 
4 TREATY SUPPLEMENTING THE PARIS CONVENTION AS FAR AS PATENTS ARE CONCERNED, ART. 11, Supra note 2. at 2; IdId. 
at 21 
The entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement in 1994 marked the first step in true substantive 
harmonisation of patent laws. Many of the provisions of the Old Patent Harmonization Treaty were 
utilised in the TRIPS Agreement, including the articles relating to patentable subject matter, conditions 
on patent applicants and term of the patent6. The TRIPS Agreement laid down minimum standards 
required to be followed  by all WTO member states  in their national patent laws, and did not prevent 
the adoption of higher patent standards, if so desired7.  
Though the TRIPS Agreement is considered the strongest example of substantive harmonization of 
patent law, it does not mark the end of the process. In 2001, the WIPO launched a Patent Agenda in 
order to make the process of international patent protection 'yet more user-friendly, cost-effective and 
secure.'8  As part of the Patent Agenda, the WIPO developed the Substantive Patent Law Treaty 
(SPLT), a proposed treaty aimed to focus on issues of relevance to the grant of patents, such as the 
definition of prior art, novelty, inventive step/non-obviousness, industrial applicability/utility, the 
drafting and interpretation of claims and the requirement of sufficient disclosure of the invention9. T
SPLT is considered to be an attempt towards 'deep harmonization' of the substantive aspects of patent 
law and practice
he 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
10, with the aim of travelling far beyond the minimum requirements laid down in 
the TRIPS Agreement, with firmer commitments on substantive aspects of patent law. Discussions 
concerning the SPLT are currently under way,  with the Thirteenth Session of the Standing Committee
5 TREATY SUPPLEMENTING THE PARIS CONVENTION AS FAR AS PATENTS ARE CONCERNED, ART. 10; Id. at 20Id. at 20 
6 AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS [TRIPS], ANNEX 1C TO THE 
MARRAKESH 
 AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 15 APRIL 1994, ARTS. 27, 29 AND 33 
7 Id., Art. 1(1) 
8 MEMORANDUM OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL, WIPO DOCUMENT A/36/14,  ‘AGENDA FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE  
 INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM’,  6 AUGUST 2001, GENEVA, AT 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/govbody/en/a_36/a_36_14.pdf, PARA 3 
9 FOURTH SESSION OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS,  WIPO DOCUMENT SCP/4/2, SUGGESTIONS FOR 
THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL PATENT LAW, 25 SEPTEMBER, 2000, GENEVA,  3,  
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_4/scp_4_2.pdf  
10  JEROME H. REICHMAN & ROCHELLE DREYFUSS, HARMONIZATION WITHOUT CONSENSUS: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON 
DRAFTING A   SUBSTANTIVE PATENT LAW TREATY,  SSRN ELIBRARY, 90, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1028331  
on the law of Patents (SCP) convening on March 23rd, 200911.  
                                                
The SPLT is still far ahead in the horizon, and the current state of the art of multilateral patent 
harmonization lies within the TRIPS Agreement. However, the protections afforded by the TRIPS 
Agreement have been found insufficient by a number of developed countries, which seek to pursue 
higher standards of patent harmonization through bilateral negotiations. 
 Bilateral Harmonization Efforts 
While the standards of patent protection required by the TRIPS Agreement were higher than those 
earlier adopted by many developing countries, they were nevertheless weaker than those accepted by 
the developed countries. With the surge in international trade in goods and knowledge, the need was 
felt for stronger standards than those afforded under the TRIPS. By utilising the flexibilities allowed 
under the TRIPS Agreement for countries to adopt higher standards than those specified in the 
agreement, the US and the EU sought to strengthen these standards through bilateral negotiation. Since 
1994, the United States and the European Union have entered into a number of free trade agreements 
with a number of developing countries, incorporating higher standards of intellectual property 
protection as conditions to these agreements. The US-Chile FTA requires Chile to propose legislation 
making available  patent protection for plants12 even though the TRIPS Agreement permits the 
exclusion of such provisions13. Similar provisions are reflected in the US-Morocco FTA and the US-
Bahrain FTA14. Other clauses utilised in other US FTAs limit the ability of countries to use compulsory 
 
11 THE PAPERS OF THE THIRTEENTH SESSION AS PRODUCED SO FAR ARE AVAILABLE AT 
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/details.jsp?meeting_id=17448  
12 UNITED STATES-CHILE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, 2003, ART. 17.9:2, 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.html    
13 SUPRA NOTE 6, ART. 27.3(B) 
14 UNITED STATES-MOROCCO FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, 2004, ART. 15.9:2, 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Morocco_FTA/Section_Index.html ; UNITED STATES-BAHRAIN FREE 
TRADE AGREEMENT, 2003, ART. 14.8.1, 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Bahrain_FTA/Section_Index.html  
licensing provisions15, revocation of patents16 and other aspects of patent regulation. While these 
treaties and those entered into by the  European Union are bilateral in nature, they have been entered 
into with a large number of countries, with the result that they constitute a process of harmonization in 
themselves. The proliferation of such free trade agreements or Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) 
represent a process that sees the rapid globalisation of the intellectual property norms propogated by 
their supporters17.  They also ensure that the developing countries that enter into them are integrated 
into international regimes of intellectual property protection far beyond those envisaged by existing 
standards such as the TRIPS Agreement18. In addition to this, these treaties also require these 
developing countries to comply with multilateral standards in conventions to which they are not a party, 
or to ratify international IP treaties which they have no obligation to  comply with19, thereby increasing 
the standard of intellectual property compliance worldwide. 
                                                 
15 UNITED STATES-SINGAPORE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, 2003, ART.16.7:6, 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore_FTA/Section_Index.html  
16 SUPRA NOTE 12, ART. 17.9:5; SUPRA NOTE 15, ART. 15.9:4;  SUPRA NOTE 14, ART. 14.8:4 
17  DRAHOS PETER; DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STANDARD-SETTING; STUDY 
PREPARED FOR THE UK COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, 2002; AVAILABLE AT 
http://www.iprcommission.org , p. 22 
18 ID AT P. 22 
19 FOR EXAMPLE, SEE ARTICLE 4.1 AND 4.29 OF THE UNITES STATES-JORDAN FTA, 2000,   
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Jordan/Section_Index.html  
II. The Argument for Diversity in National Patent Laws 
Today, we live in a world where patent sytems are increasingly harmonized, with almost all national 
patent regimes moving towards conformity with the TRIPS Agreement, and many moving beyond. 
However, there is a strong need to examine whether such a system of international patent 
harmonization that requires many parties to move towards stronger patent laws is beneficial for all 
parties. Although a number of studies have established a relationship between strong intellectual 
property regimes and economic growth20, others have determined that intellectual property regimes are 
actually detrimental to such growth21. It is proposed that one of the primary reasons for this apparent 
conflict concerning the effects of strong patent systems is founded upon an assumption that such effects 
would apply consistently across countries with vastly different economic, cultural and developmental 
backgrounds. Existing approaches to  international intellectual property standard-setting follow the 'one  
size fits all' policy of creating a unified system of strong patent protection for all countries. However, a 
variety of historical, economic and social factors show, to the contrary, that such a unified approach 
towards intellectual property  policy is not merely lacking in benefits  towards certain countries, but 
may be detrimental towards them as well.  
 
 Historical Arguments for Patent Diversity 
 
It has been noted that one of the reasons for the rapid increase in manufacturing productivity in the 
United States was a strong patent system,  and its careful evolution to fit the needs of the American 
economy22. However, it has also noted that the creation of a system was the result of a deliberate and 
                                                 
20 David M. Gould & William C. Gruben, The role of intellectual property rights in economic growth, 48  JOURNAL OF 
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 323-350 (1996) 
21 MASKUS, KEITH. E.; SYMPOSIUM:TAKING STOCK: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: LESSONS 
FROM STUDYING THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS; 53 VAND. L. REV 2219,  2222 
22 KHAN, ZORINA B.; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN 
HISTORY; STUDY PREPARED FOR THE UK COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, 2002; AVAILABLE AT 
conscious  process of tailoring to suit the national interest23. Similarly, the patent systems of the States 
comprising European system were also created by a similar system of customisation towards the 
specific needs of their countries at specific times24. The patent systems of most developing countries, 
however, are largely the legacy of colonial policy and empire-building25. Patent laws were imposed on 
colonies such as Malaysia, the Philippines, Korea and India, and retained subsequent to their 
liberation26. Upon gaining independence, many of these countries began to customise their patent 
systems in order to reflect their own economic and industrial interests. Accordingly, a number of them, 
such as India, Brazil, Argentina and Mexico began to lower standards in order to provide breathing 
room for rapidly developing generic pharmaceutical industries27. In India, in particular, the rapid 
evolution of the Indian pharmaceutical industry was facilitated by a major change in India's patent laws 
in 1970, reducing the scope of patentablility in food, chemicals and pharmaceuticals to processes of 
manufacture instead of products,  with a simultaneous reduction in the term of protection granted to 
such patents28. The connection between the growth of this industry and the relatively weaker patent 
protections afforded by India's change in patent policy was evident29. This process of customisation, in 
India and in other countries, was widely criticised by countries with strong intellectual property 
regimes, and was one of the factors that prompted the United States and the US big business 
community to lobby for the inclusion of the TRIPS Agreement in the Uruguay Trade Round of the 
GATT30. However, it  is important to note that the history of patent policy worldwide indicates a 
pattern similar to that followed by the developing countries. 
                                                                                                                                                                       
http://www.iprcommission.org, , 20 
23 ID AT 21 
24 ID AT 4 
25 SUPRA NOTE 17 AT 7 
26 ID AT 8 
27 ID AT 9 
28 KUMAR, NAGESH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: EXPERIENCES OF ASIAN 
COUNTRIES; STUDY PREPARED FOR THE UK COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, 2002; AVAILABLE AT 
http://www.iprcommission.org,  27 
29 KUMAR, NAGESH AND MOHAMMED SAQIB (1996) FIRM SIZE, OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADAPTATION AND IN-HOUSE R&D 
ACTIVITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIS: THE CASE OF INDIAN MANUFACTURING; RESEARCH POLICY; 25(5): 712-22, 719 
30 SSusan K Sell, Intellectual Property Protection and Antitrust in the Developing World: Crisis, Coercion, and Choice, 49  
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 315-49 (1995) 
Historical analyses  of various patent systems have yielded the conclusion that a number of developed 
countries had, at different times, adopted patent systems with weaker  levels of protection in order to 
promote the growth of fledgeling technology-dependent industries31. One example of this 
involves the United Kingdom, which changed its patent laws between 1919 and 1949 in order to 
exclude chemical products from patent production in order to ward off the threat posed by the German 
chemical industry and which allowed for a system of licenses of right until 1977, allowing British 
manufacturers to compel foreign patentees to permit the use of their patents on pharmaceuticals and 
food products32. In addition, patent protection for medicines was excluded under French and Japanese 
patent laws until recently33. This diversity in patent law was, by no means, reduced in the last century, 
with a study by the WIPO in 1988 demonstrating that of the 98 members of the Paris Convention, 49 
excluded product patent protection for pharmaceuticals, 45 excluded animal varieties, 44 excluded 
plant varieties and 22 excluded chemical products34. 
 
 Economic Arguments for Patent Diversity 
 
In order to determine an economic argument for patent diversity,  it is  important to understand the 
underlying benefits granted by a patent system. However, prior even to that, it is important to 
understand the basic assumptions made in evaluating such benefits. The first such assumption is that 
society needs more inventions than would be made if society did not offer an incentive to invent. The 
second assumption is that the best such incentive is the exclusivity provided by the patent system35.   
                                                 
31 MOSER, PETRA, HOW DO PATENT LAWS INFLUENCE INNOVATION? EVIDENCE FROM NINETEENTH-CENTURY WORLD'S FAIRS, 95  
THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 1214-1236, 1231 (2005) 
32 SUPRA NOTE 22 AT 14 
33 Id at 16,  28 
34 WIPO, EXISTENCE, SCOPE AND FORM OF GENERALLY INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTED AND APPLIED STANDARDS/NORMS FOR THE PROTECTION 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY; MTN.GNG/NG11/W/24/REV.1; 15 SEPTEMBER 1988; 
http://www.tripsagreement.net/documents/GATTdocs/erally_Internationally_Accepted_and_Applied_Standards_&_Nor
ms_for_the_Protection_of_IP_-_Revision_E_E.pdf   
 
35 TURNER, DONALD. F., THE PATENT SYSTEM AND COMPETITIVE POLICY, 44 NYU L REV 450-476, 435, 1969 
These assumptions, as stated, have not necessarily  met with unanimous acceptance36. However, on 
the basis of their acceptance lies the foundation of the patent system, and the benefits associated with it. 
The primary benefit derived from the patent system consists of those benefits derived from inventions 
that would not have been made but for it. It is assumed by some that many inventions that constitute a 
genuine revolution in production or consumption patterns are patent-induced, requiring, as they do, 
large investments and high risks of failure37.  
Ranged against this benefit are a number of costs that may accrue to a country from having a patent 
system. Donald Turner had listed seven cost elements that may be attributed to a  patent system38. They 
are listed as follows: 
i. Administrative costs 
ii. The underutilisation of inventions that have obtained protection under the patent system but 
 would have been produced without a patent system 
iii. losses from the abuse of the patent monopoly, including antitrust violations, term extension and 
 patent misuse 
iv. research expenditures undertaken by competitors in attempting to avoid the patent rights owned 
 by others 
v. losses incurred as a result of investments in patents in non-innovative products in order to 
 preclude competitors from marketing those inventions, with no intention to market or produce 
 such inventions themselves (patent trolling) 
vi. the inhibition of inventive activity in areas heavily covered by the patents of competitors (the 
 patent thicket problem) 
vii. The apparent over-allocation of resources to applied research over basic research, with 
                                                 
36 A. SAMUEL ODDI, THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM AND THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT: REALITY OR MYTH?, 1987  DUKE 
LAW JOURNAL 831-878, 837 (1987). 
37 F. M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 448 (1970) 
38 Supra note 35 at 454 
 inventors foregoing allocation of resources for basic research in favour of more the more 
 profitable returns from the patent monopoly. 
These benefits and costs play against each other to varying degrees in most developed country patent 
systems. The decisions of these countries to promote and strengthen their systems of patent protection 
indicates benefits outweighing costs in such systems.  
However, decisions concerning the benefits and costs of a patent system in a developing country 
require a rethinking of the underlying assumptions concerning these benefits and costs. In addition to 
the abovementioned assumptions of the patent system (i.e. those concerning society's needs for 
inventions that would not be created without an incentive for invention and that the best such incentive 
is offered through the patent system)an additional assumption is required for a patent system to 
function within a developing country: that the grant of patents on such inventions will lead to 
development39. Due to the specific problems of developing countries, they are more in need of 
technologies that would improve the standards of existing and nascent industries and promote 
development, as opposed to those that would revolutionise40. The implication of this is that the 
former two assumptions concerning the patent system may require further scrutiny in the light of the 
latter. 
In addition to problems concerning the basic assumptions underpinning a patent system, it is important 
to face the reality of the international patent system as applied to developing countries, namely, that the 
majority of patents granted in developing country patent systems are granted to foreigners41. 
Given this reality, it is important to understand that the existence of a patent system within such a 
developing country would serve less to promote new inventions within that country than to extend 
protection to inventions developed in other countries, and sought to be utilised within the developing 
                                                 
39 SUPRA NOTE 36 AT 843 
40 ID. AT 844 
41 SUN, YIFEI, DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN PATENTS IN CHINA, 25  WORLD PATENT INFORMATION 27-37 (2003); MATTHEWS, 
DUNCAN, GLOBALISING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 202 (2002); CHEN, EDWARD K. Y. ET AL., TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 486 (1994) 
country42.  As a result of this, developing countries would find that developmental benefits associated 
with a particular invention would be easier to obtain without the patent system than with it, and that, 
due to the list of costs associated with a patent system, the most cost-effective manner of obtaining 
benefits from an invention would be to reduce or free itself of restraints imposed upon itself by the 
patent system. This is the realisation arrived at by the newly independent colonies in lowering their 
patent standards to promote fledgeling industries and to encourage reverse-engineering43. An analysis 
of the history of patent law worldwide would support this assertion, with the experiences faced by 
developed countries in the evolution of their patent systems when they were at a lower state of 
development. 
 
                                                 
42 supra note 36 at 846 
43 Supra note 27 
III. Comparative Study of Selected Factors of Patent Law and Regulation 
 
An understanding of the benefits of tailoring patent regimes to suit  country interests would be helped 
by a comparison of different countries and their patent regimes. Within the analysis of countries 
presented by Maskus by intellectual property usage and preference of intellectual property regime, the 
United States would be considered an IP exporter44, with high levels of production and sale of 
intellectual property and an interest in strong international rights. India, on the other hand, would be 
considered an IP follower45, an industrialising economy which needs access to inexpensive and readily 
diffused access to modern technology, and a mixed interest, situated between encouraging incoming 
technology flows and weak standards to promote imitation and learning. A  comparison of their patent 
regimes shows that, as far as possible within the standards established by international patent 
harmonisation, the patent laws of the US and India reflect the interests specific to their utilizations of 
intellectual property. 
  The Indian Patent Act, 1970 
Patent laws in India have been in existence since the time of the British colonization. The Patents and 
Designs Act had been passed in 1911, and continued to be in force after India achieved independence in 
1947. However, the act was reformed in 1970, after successful lobbying efforts by India's nascent 
pharmaceutical industry46. The new Patents Act, 1970 reduced the scope of patentability in food, 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals, limiting patent protection for these categories to process protection 
instead of product protection.With India's ratification of the TRIPS Agreement, India was required to 
amend its patent laws in 1999, 2002 and again in 2005. The current version of the Indian Patents Act 
provides product protection to all categories of invention, but with strong limitations upon the scope of 
                                                 
44 Supra note 21, p. 2 
45 Id, p. 2 
46 Supra note 28, p. 27 
such protection. 
 
Substantive Provisions: Comparison between India and the United States 
 Patentable Subject Matter 
India: Some of the most significant substantive provisions of the Indian Patent Act, 1970 deal with the 
scope of patentable subject matter. As was mentioned earlier, product protection for pharmaceuticals, 
chemicals and food products was provided under the 2005 Act. However, these provisions were 
tempered by the introduction of Section 3(d) into the Act, which denied protection to new forms, 
properties or uses of known substances which did not enhance efficacy47. Other provisions of the Act 
deny protection to plants, animals and essentially biological processes of their production or 
propogation48, business methods and computer programs per se49 and mental acts or methods50. 
The United States: US patent laws provide much broader grounds for patentability, allowing for the 
patenting of new and useful processes, machines, manufactures or compositions of matter, or new and 
useful improvements thereof51. US Courts have interpreted this provision to allow for the patenting of 
new life forms52, computer software53 and business methods54. However, the scope of patentability of 
business methods and computer software has been limited somewhat in recent Supreme Court 
decisions55. 
 Qualifications for Invention: Novelty, Utility and Obviousness 
In addition to patentable subject matter, the Indian Patent Act also provides more stringent statutory 
                                                 
47 The Patents Act, 1970, Section 3(d) 
48 Id, Section 3(j) 
49 Id, Section 3(k) 
50 Id, Section 3(m) 
51 35 U.S.C. §101 
52 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) 
53 In re Alapatt, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
54 State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (CAFC 1998) 
55 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
requirements for novelty, obviousness and utility. The Act requires that patents may only be granted to 
inventions, and an invention is defined as a new product or process involving an inventive step and 
capable of industrial application56.  
 Utility 
India: The utility requirement in India corresponds to the  requirement for 'industrial application', 
which, unlike the US requirement for utility, requires that an invention be capable of being made or 
used in an industry57. In interpretation, however, Courts have agreed that the parameters of an 
invention 'being made or being used in an industry' are broad. 
                                                
United States: In the United States, the utility requirement is more liberal, allowing for the patenting of 
an invention as long as it 'is useful'58. This requirement has been interpreted by US Courts as indicating 
that the invention must have some specific utility, and that such utility be disclosed at the time of 
patenting59. Beyond these limitations, however, the utility requirement is limited. 
Obviousness 
India: The obviousness requirement corresponds to the 'inventive step'  requirement, which was 
modified in 2005. The new inventive step clause requires the invention to have a feature that involves a 
technical advance compared to existing knowledge or economic significance, either or both of which 
should make the invention non-obvious to a person skilled in the art60.  
The United States: The non-obviousness requirement in US law declares that an invention is to be 
considered obvious if the an analysis of the differences between the subject matter and the prior art 
show that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to 
 
56  Supra note 47, Section 2(j) 
57 Id, Section 2(ac) 
58 Supra note 51 
59 In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560 (CAFC 1995) 
60 Id, Section 2(ja) 
a person having ordinary skill in the art61.  The analysis of the obviousness requirement under US 
patent law has been detailed, and the creation of a number of formal tests and indicators of obviousness 
have somewhat restricted the scope of usage of this provision. Recently, however, US Supreme Court 
reversed the reliance on formal tests such as the Teaching-Suggestion and Motivation test and 
reinstated a broader analysis of obviousness62. 
 Novelty 
India: The novelty requirement corresponds to the 'new invention' clause in the Act, which requires 
that the invention has not been anticipated by publication or use anywhere in the world prior to the 
filing of the patent application63. 
United States:  A significant difference between US and Indian patent laws lies in the fact that the US 
novelty requirement requires that the patent not be known or used by others within the US, but only 
that it not be patented or described in a printed publication in any other country64.   
 
Administrative Provisions 
 Pre-Grant Oppositions 
The Indian patent laws also provide more stringent procedures for the obtaining of a patent. Among  the 
strictest of such procedures are  those allowing for pre-grant oppositions, which allow any person to 
file a petition before the concerned patent office opposing a pending patent application65.  The grounds 
for the filing of such an opposition are detailed, and cover patentable subject matter66, novelty67, 
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obviousness68, wrongful obtaining of the invention69, insufficient disclosure70. The representation for a 
pre-grant opposition may be filed by any person, and is not limited to interested parties, allowing for 
the representation of public interest groups and other such parties71. 
The patent laws of the United States do not presently offer any provisions for pre-grant oppositions. All 
oppositions that may be raised by a third party must arise after the grant of the patent. 
 Compulsory Licenses 
Another important administrative procedure allowed for under the Act is the provision of compulsory 
licenses for the manufacture and export of patented pharmaceutical products to any country having 
insufficient manufacturing capacity and in order to address public health problems, provided that such 
compulsory licence or an allowance of importation has been granted by such country72. 
 
                                                 
68 Id, Section 25(1)(e) 
69 Id, Section 25(1)(a) 
70 Id, Section 25(1)(g), (h) 
71 Id, Section 25(1) 
72 Id, Section 92A 
Conclusion 
 
The evolution of patent law within any country must proceed in order to ensure that the patent system 
is beneficial to its economic interests at every stage in its development. The rapid harmonization of 
patent laws worldwide, however, is beginning to ensure that countries have little scope for the 
protection of their economic interests. The objective of every patent system should be the promotion of 
innovation within its creator country. However, with stronger intellectual property regimes, developing 
countries may be required to invest in strong IP regimes to protect innovation originating in other 
countries, with little or no technological benefit accruing to them. While the TRIPS Agreement still 
allows for some level of flexibility in tailoring patent laws, the international patent regulation scenario 
is focussed on a shift towards stronger and more harmonised regimes, with the discussions concerning 
the WIPO's SPLT providing the multilateral push forward, and the incorporation of intellectual  
property clauses in free trade agreements providing impetus bilaterally. 
From the experience of developed countries in their patent histories, it is clear that they have utilized 
their opportunities to adjust national patent laws to suit their needs at lower stages of development, and 
that they have benefitted from these opportunities. It is only through the utilisation of these 
opportunities that countries such as the United States and the European nations have reached a level of 
technological predominance. However, judging by the experience of developing countries under the 
TRIPS Agreement and beyond, it appears that this same opportunity may be denied to the countries that 
need it the most.  
